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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On appeal, Mr. Chaput argued the district court erred by improperly sua sponte taking
judicial notice of the entire record from the underlying criminal case and by dismissing his
petition without appointing post-conviction counsel. The State has all but conceded the central
point on both those issues.
For example, the State essentially conceded that the district court’s decision to take
judicial notice was contrary to the applicable rule. (Resp. Br., p.9 (“The state agrees that, in
many cases, this approach would contravene the rule.”).) Nevertheless, the State tried to justify
that erroneous decision, but all its arguments are contrary to the plain language of the rule and
the applicable precedent.
Likewise, the State acknowledged Mr. Chaput’s allegations raised the possibility of a
valid claims, since they could “theoretically show deficient performance.” (Resp. Br., p.17.)
However, as with the judicial notice issue, the State still tried to justify the district court’s
erroneous decision by making arguments which are contrary to, or based on misunderstandings
of, the relevant precedent.
Since none of the State’s attempted justifications of the admittedly-erroneous decisions
are meritorious, this Court should grant Mr. Chaput relief in light of those admittedly-erroneous
decisions.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Chaput’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Chaput’s petition for postconviction relief without appointing an attorney.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Chaput’s Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief Without Appointing An Attorney

A.

Despite Essentially Conceding The Error, The State’s Attempts To Justify The District
Court’s Decision To Sua Sponte Take Judicial Notice, Are Not Consistent With The
Applicable Rule And Associated Precedent

1.

The district court’s express decision to take judicial notice was sufficient to
preserve a challenge to the propriety of that decision for appeal

The State essentially conceded that the district court’s decision to sua sponte take judicial
notice of the entire criminal record not consistent with the applicable rule. (Resp. Br., p.9 (“The
state agrees that, in many cases, this approach would contravene the rule.”).) However, it tries to
avoid that issue by contending the issue is not preserved for appeal. That argument is directly
contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court precedent on point.
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, “if the issue was argued to, or decided by, the
district court it can form the basis for review by this Court.” State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868
(2019) (emphasis added). Therefore, since the district court expressly decided the issue of
judicial notice, the propriety of its decision on that point is properly raised on appeal.
In fact, the State itself recently, successfully argued this point to the Court of Appeals.
State v. Wilson, ___ P.3d ___, 2020 WL 4876845 (Ct. App. Aug. 2020), not yet final. In Wilson,
the State argued to the district court that the traffic stop was justified as part of the officer’s
caretaking function, and thus, did not need to be supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at *2.
The district court rejected the community-caretaker argument. Id. It also held that the detention
was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and therefore, ordered all the evidence subsequently
found to be suppressed. Id. The State abandoned the community caretaker argument on appeal,
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arguing instead that the district court’s determination that there was no reasonable suspicion was
erroneous. Id. The Court of Appeals held that, because the district court had actually ruled on
the question of reasonable suspicion, the State could make that new argument for the first time
on appeal because the issue was preserved by the district court’s decision. Id at **2-3 (quoting
Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868, and State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998)). The same is true in
Mr. Chaput’s case – his challenge to the propriety of the district court’s express decision is
preserved for appeal based on the standard reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Jeske.
Nevertheless, contrary to the position it just argued in Wilson, the State now contends
Jeske is inapplicable in this circumstance based on a misreading of a footnote in McKinney v.
State, 162 Idaho 286, 290 n.2 (2017). (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) A proper reading of McKinney
reveals that the Supreme Court was not not trying to establish a unique preservation rule specific
to decisions for judicial notice, but rather, was noting a potential error in a capital case which had
not been raised, had not been objected to, on appeal. McKinney, 162 Idaho at 289-90 & n.2.
This is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that the footnote is not even a part of the Court’s
analysis; it is in the Court’s recitation of the Factual Background.1 See id. at 289-90.
That is further revealed by the fact that the McKinney footnote was not necessary to
decide any of the issues actually raised in that appeal. See generally id. at 291-97. The primary
issue in McKinney was whether the district court had dismissed the post-conviction claims
without giving the petitioner proper notice of the reasons for doing so. See generally McKinney,
162 Idaho at 291-97.

Otherwise, it was evaluating whether the petitioner, who, unlike

Mr. Chaput, was represented by post-conviction counsel, had actually alleged sufficient facts to

1

The factual background also reveals that McKinney was dealing with an order granting the
State’s motion for judicial notice, not a sua sponte decision by the district court. See McKinney,
162 Idaho at 290.
4

establish genuine issues of material fact. See generally id. As such, the footnote on which the
State relies was, at best, dicta, which, of course, means it is not binding on other courts. See
State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74 (2013) (explaining “dicta” refers to a statement in an opinion
which “is not necessary to decide the issue presented to the appellate court” and it is not
controlling authority). As a result, the State’s attempt to rely on that non-controlling footnote,
particularly to the direct contradiction of more recent Idaho Supreme Court decision directly on
point, is improper. See State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013) (explaining that the Court
will not necessarily comb through precedent to see if a new opinion happens to contradict a prior
opinion; it simply expects lower courts and parties to follow the Court’s most recent statement of
the law, which, in this case, would be Jeske).
Since, properly understood, McKinney does not carve out a unique exception to the
preservation rules for sua sponte decisions for judicial notice, this Court should consider
Mr. Chaput’s argument about the impropriety of the district court’s express decision, just like the
Courts in Jeske and Wilson did.

2.

The rule itself requires the district court to identify the specific documents noticed
in the decision to take notice itself; subsequent references to some of the
documents improperly noticed is not enough to retroactively declare the notice
decision proper

The State also tries to justify the district court’s erroneous actions by contending the
requisite specificity can be gleaned from the district court’s subsequent decision. That argument
improperly puts the cart before the horse. If the district court did not properly exercise its
discretion in taking judicial notice, none of those documents were properly before the district
court in the first place, and so, any reliance on them is improper. See Taylor v. McNichols, 149
Idaho 826, 833 (2010) (quoting Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276 (Ct. App. 1990)
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(“‘[t]he only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim are those appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court may
properly judicially notice.’”) (emphasis from Hellickson, brackets from Taylor).
In Hellickson, the Court of Appeals was reviewing the lower court’s decision to take
judicial notice of various documents when deciding a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
See Taylor, 149 Idaho at 833 (explaining the decision in Hellickson). The Court of Appeals held
it was improper for the district court to have taken judicial notice, and so, remanded the case
with instruction to consider the issue based only on the information properly before the court.
Id.; accord Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) (“When the discretion
exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is to note
the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings.”).
The Supreme Court took a similar approach in Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407, 414 (2018).
In that case, one of the petitioner’s claims was that trial counsel had been ineffective for not
requesting a lesser included instruction based on Idaho’s statutory theory. Id. at 419. The
charging document was one of the documents of which the petitioner moved the district court to
take judicial notice. See id. at 413-14. However, having determined the district court did not err
in refusing to take judicial notice of those documents, the Supreme Court refused to consider the
contents of the charging document in its appellate review of that issue. Id. at 419.
The same result should occur in Mr. Chaput’s case.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 201

specifically provides that, “When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts
from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court must identify the specific documents
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or items so noticed.”2 I.R.E. 201(c) (emphasis added). Thus, by its plain language, the rule only
gives the district court discretion to “take judicial notice of records or transcripts from the court
file in the same case, so long as the court identifies the documents or items of which it is taking
notice” in the order taking judicial notice. Matter of Guardianship of Doe, 166 Idaho 720, ___,
462 P.3d 1184, 1189-90 (Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added).3 Since the district court in this case
failed to identify those documents with specificity in its order, it abused its discretion by taking
judicial notice of all those documents since it did not act within the outer bounds of its discretion
and inconsistent with the applicable legal standards. As a result, just as in Hellickson and Rome,
none of those documents were properly before the district court, which means it could not
properly consider or refer to those documents in its ensuing decision.
Moreover, the Rome Court explained that “surface-level specifications” to the contents of
certain documents, such as the trial transcript, are not enough to meet the specificity
requirements of I.R.E. 201. Rome, 164 Idaho at 415. The references in the district court’s
decision, to which the State points are the same type of insufficient “surface-level
specifications.” (See Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) The Rome Court did not draw the distinction for
which the State now argues, between “complex civil cases” and post-conviction cases. (Resp.
Br., p.11.) Rather, the Rome Court made it clear that the same interpretation of the rule to postconviction cases. See Rome, 164 Idaho at 415. Thus, the State’s argument in this regard is
2

Prior to 2018, the rule actually only allowed for judicial notice to be taken of an adjudicative
fact within the document, not, technically, the document itself. See Rome v. State, 164 Idaho
407, 414 (2018). Mr. Chaput’s petition was filed after the rule was amended in 2018, so the
current version of the rule controls. Compare id. at 412 n.3 (applying the prior version of the
rule because the decision at issue was made prior to the 2018 amendment).
3
Mr. Chaput acknowledges that the district court did not have the benefit of the decision in
Guardianship of Doe when it made its decision in his case, but it did have the language of the
rule, and all Guardianship of Doe does is point out the plain language of that rule is clear.
Besides, the district court did have the advantage of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rome,
which also discussed in detail the need for specificity in the context of judicial notice.
7

fundamentally flawed. In fact, its argument in that regard is particularly concerning because it
does not so much as acknowledge the decision in Rome in its brief. Compare State v. Islas, 165
Idaho 260, 266 n.1 (Ct. App. 2019) (criticizing the State for making arguments without
discussing the relevant new Supreme Court precedent).
For all these reasons, the State’s attempt to justify the district court’s decision to take
judicial notice despite essentially conceding it to have been error are meritless and should be
rejected accordingly.

Rather, as in Hellickson, this case should be remanded for a proper

consideration of the facts properly before the district court.

B.

The State Acknowledged Mr. Chaput’s Allegations Would Satisfy The Deficient
Performance Prong With Regard To His Claim About Counsel Promising A Sentence
Similar to the judicial notice issue, the State acknowledged the central aspect of the

merits argument by admitting “a claim of attorney misadvise about a potential sentence . . . could
theoretically show deficient performance.” (Resp. Br., p.17.) The applicable standard of review
when the district court dismisses a petition without appointing counsel only looks to whether the
petitioner “alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim.” Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 793 (2004) (emphasis added). Thus, the State’s concession that Mr. Chaput raised a
theoretically-possible claim should end the analysis.
Nevertheless, the State contends it was still okay for the district court to dismiss
Mr. Chaput’s petition without appointing counsel based on an analysis of the documents of
which the district court did not properly take judicial notice. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) As discussed
in Section A, supra, since those documents were properly before the district court, it is improper
to base appellate arguments or analysis on those documents.
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However, even if this Court were to consider the contents of the improperly-noticed
documents, the State’s arguments are still not persuasive they run contrary to the applicable legal
standard, and they do not actually address the merits of Mr. Chaput’s allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
To the first point, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held the whole point of the
analysis at this stage is not to assess the truth of the claims, but to see whether a reasonable
person with means would hire counsel to investigate the truth of the allegations. Swader v. State,
143 Idaho 651, 654 (2007); Charboneau 140 Idaho at 793; Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679
(2001), superseded by statue on other grounds. In Swader, for example, the only allegations at
issue were the allegations that “[the jailor] talked about me to his wife” who ended up being a
juror on the case, and that a pill bottle, which was never introduced into evidence, was left in
view of the jurors during the trial. Id. (spelling corrected). Presumably, the trial record would
have revealed the wife-juror’s responses to the questions about whether she had any knowledge
of this particular defendant, but that was not the issue. See id. at 652 (noting the defendant had
twice appealed the conviction in the criminal case). Likewise, presumably, the trial record
would have revealed whether the pill bottles were admitted into evidence, and how they might
have been used in the trial, but again, that was not the issue in the context of appointing postconviction counsel. See id. No, the issue in Swader was whether a reasonable person with
means would have hired counsel to investigate the facts alleged by the defendant-petitioner “to
investigate whether the jailor actually talked to his wife about Swader prior to the end of the
trial” and whether the failure to object to the presence of the pill bottles “provided a basis for
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 654.
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The same is true with respect to the State’s arguments in Mr. Chaput’s case. Even though
the district court may have told Mr. Chaput that it had the discretion to impose whatever
sentence it felt appropriate within the statutory maximum, and even though the prosecutor may
have been going to recommend some other sentence, a reasonable person with means would still
have hired an attorney to investigate the claim that trial counsel promised he would get a
different sentence. (R., p.10 (alleging counsel “told me to sign the plea deal that I would get a
rider or at the worse I would get a 2 fix with time served and do a program and get out.”).) That
is because, by promising what sentence would be imposed, trial counsel was essentially telling
Mr. Chaput that, while the district court could impose any sentence with the maximum (as the
district court subsequently reaffirmed), it would not exercise that discretion in his case, and it
would not follow the prosecutor’s recommendation. That a reasonable person with means would
hire an attorney to conduct this investigation is particularly apparent because of the allegation
that trial counsel also directed Mr. Chaput to falsely answer the questions during the plea
colloquy. (R., pp.7, 11.) That additional allegation demonstrates that the information upon
which the State seeks to rely is not, in fact reliable.
The State’s only other argument on this point – that an attorney’s promise of a particular
sentence can never be prejudicial if the district court subsequently addresses the maximum
possible sentence in the plea colloquy (Resp. Br., p.17 (citing Womak v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998,
1004 (9th Cir. 2007), and Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994)) – is
no more persuasive.

That is because, not only is that argument actually contrary to the

applicable Idaho and United States Supreme Court precedent, it is also based on a misreading of
the two Ninth Circuit cases.
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Neither Womack nor Gonzalez actually involve a claim of a promised sentence (that the
sentencing court would impose a particular sentence or would engage in a downward departure).
See generally Womack, 497 F.3d 998; Gonzalez, 33 F.3d 1047.

Rather, both those cases

specifically dealt with a claim that counsel had made a “gross miscalculation” as to what the
potential sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines actually was. Womack, 497 F.3d at
1003 (“In arguing that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance, Womack claims . . . . (2) his
counsel’s advice that his guilty plea was his ‘best chance’ of him receiving thirty to forty years
was a ‘gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome . . . .’”); Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1051
(“Gonzalez claims here that . . . counsel’s alleged gross miscalculation of the sentence he would
likely receive upon pleading guilty, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .”).
Considering the claims actually made in those cases, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions make
perfect sense – the district court’s recitation of the true potential sentence meant there was no
prejudice from counsels’ miscalculations. Compare Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104, 105-06
(1968) (pointing out that good-faith advice from counsel about the likely outcome at sentencing,
without more, is not sufficient to establish coercion).
However, that analysis does not translate to Mr. Chaput’s claim that counsel promised
him what sentence the court would impose because the district court’s point about what the full
scope of its discretion was does not actually contradict the alleged promise that the district court
would not actually exercise its full discretion in that regard. Therefore, the State’s proposed
bright line rule is not supported by the case law it cites.
In fact, the State’s proposed rule is actually contrary to the applicable controlling
precedent, which holds that if a plea is induced by a promise of a particular sentence (as opposed
to a good-faith estimation), that can, in fact, be prejudicial because reliance on such a promise
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can deprive the guilty plea of the requisite voluntary nature. Machibroda v. United States, 368
U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (discussing a petitioner’s reliance on a promise made by a prosecutor);
Davidson, 92 Idaho at 105-06 (noting that analysis extends to promises made by defense
counsel). Thus, if allegations that the plea was based on such a promise “are true, [the petitioner]
is entitled to have his sentence vacated.” Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493. Therefore, since, as the
State acknowledged, Mr. Chaput alleged the possibility of such a claim, he was entitled to have
an attorney appointed to assist him in prosecuting that claim.

C.

Mr. Chaput’s Allegations About Not Being Shown Discovery Also Identifies The
Possibility Of A Valid Claim Of Deficient Performance
The State’s arguments with respect to Mr. Chaput’s allegations about counsel failing to

review the discovery with him before advising him to plead guilty are no more persuasive than
its arguments about his allegation about counsel promising him a sentence. In fact, the State
does not actually contest the merits of the discovery allegation, arguing instead that,
procedurally, Mr. Chaput could not get relief on that claim because he pled guilty and the failure
to review discovery is only a “trial-stage error.” (Resp. Br., p.17 (citing Bjorkland v. State, 130
Idaho 373, 378 (Ct. App. 1997).) This is not actually one of the bases on which the district court
gave notice for dismissing the claim. (See R., p.28.) As such, affirming the district court’s
otherwise-admittedly erroneous decision on this basis would be improper. See, e.g., Ridgely v.
State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010).
Moreover, Bjorkland is readily distinguishable from Mr. Chaput’s case. In Bjorkland, the
claim at issue was that trial counsel did not fully investigate the case – i.e., there was other
evidence trial counsel did not have, but should have looked for. Bjorkland, 130 Idaho at 378.
Here, however, the allegation is that trial counsel failed to allow Mr. Chaput to review the
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discovery, the evidence which trial counsel already had.

(See R., p.7.)

In other words,

Mr. Chaput was alleging he was not allowed to review the State had against him before he had to
decide whether to exercise his fundamental right to a trial, to hold the State to its burden of
proof. McCoy v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508-09 (2018) (reaffirming that part
of the accused’s right to trial is the right to maintain his innocence of the charged conduct); see
also Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1409 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in part) (describing this as the accused’s right to decide whether “to put the State to its burden”
of proof); accord Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (criticizing the
government’s argument in that case for “fail[ing] to consider the fundamental nature of the
defendant’s right to have the question of his guilt determined solely by the jury. By pleading not
guilty, the accused puts the Government to the burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Moreover, “[s]trict procedural safeguards have been erected to insure that this privilege is
not lightly waived.” Byrd, 342 F.2d at 941. It is difficult to see how an accused person could
knowingly and intelligently decide whether to waive this right without having reviewed the
evidence the State has to present at trial. Since the failure to review discovery has a direct
impact on the defendant’s decision of whether to plead or to exercise his fundamental right to a
trial, the failure to review discovery cannot be classified as “just” a trial-stage error, like the
failure to further investigate the case can. As a result, Bjorkland notwithstanding, Mr. Chaput’s
allegation about his counsel’s failure to provide him with the known discovery raises the
possibility of a valid claim even though he pled guilty.
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D.

Mr. Chaput Sufficiently Alleged The Possibility Of A Valid Claim Regarding The
Prejudice Prong
Finally, the State tries to justify the district court’s decision to dismiss despite its

acknowledgment that Mr. Chaput’s allegations identified a theoretically-possible claim by
arguing he did not present sufficient factual allegations to support his claim of prejudice because
his response to the notice of intent to dismiss was not certified. (Resp. Br., p.18.) However, the
State’s arguments in that regard continue to ignore the fundamental point the Supreme Court has
repeatedly reiterated when it comes to evaluating whether counsel should have been appointed:
“‘[T]he trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner
will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be
alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim.’” Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-54
(quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679).
To that point, at the time he filed his response to the notice of intent to dismiss,
Mr. Chaput actually submitted a letter which he wrote to the State Bar and in which he alleged
that he would have fought his case but for his attorney’s deficient performance, as an exhibit.
(R., p. 52; see generally R., pp.46-59 (the various other documentary exhibits Mr. Chaput filed to
further evidence his allegations).) This attempt to introduce evidence in this regard makes it
clear that this is not, as the State’s argument suggests, the case where the facts simply do not
exist. Rather, it demonstrates that this is precisely the sort of case contemplated by Swader and
Brown – where the incarcerated, pro se petitioner needs the assistance of counsel to get all the
relevant facts together and presented properly for the district court’s decision. See Swader, 143
Idaho at 654; Brown, 135 Idaho at 679. Mr. Chaput even specifically expressed his struggles in
this regard as part of his renewed request for counsel. (R., p.34.) Thus, this is precisely the sort
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of situation a reasonable person with means would hire an attorney to help with, and as such,
Mr. Chaput’s response to the notice of intent to dismiss and the attached exhibits are sufficient to
demonstrate the possibility of a valid claim, such that counsel should have been appointed. See
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Chaput respectfully requests this Court vacate the order summarily dismissing his
petition and remand this case for further proceedings after the appointment of post-conviction
counsel.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2020.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
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Administrative Assistant
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